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ENERGY LAW—NOT BALANCING WELL INTERESTS WELL: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MISMANAGED OIL AND GAS 
LEASE POLICY IN T.W. PHILLIPS GAS & OIL CO. V. JEDLICKA 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Real-Life Implications and Interests at Stake in Litigation Over 
the Proper Interpretation of In Paying Quantities 
The interests at odds in oil and gas lease law are several and 
intricate.  To better understand the sundry perspectives, I offer a 
hypothetical: envision Will, a college graduate from a small farming 
community in north-central Pennsylvania.1  After months of looking for 
work after graduation, Will found a position as a “landsman”2 for Good-
Faith Oil and Gas Co.  Will has been extremely successful working for 
Good-Faith because he empathizes with the hardships facing the farming 
communities he negotiates with. 
Now picture Jim, a farmer with two-hundred acres of 
underperforming corn, wheat, and pumpkin fields.  Until the local coal-
plant closed two years ago, Jim worked in the coal industry to subsidize 
his meager income.  Afraid of losing his family farm, Jim was looking 
for any opportunity available to make extra money. 
By lucky coincidence, Will and Jim met.  Will brought the 
standard-form lease he gives to landowners to sign when he believes 
Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. would benefit from the property.  The lease 
provides the usual wording, including the term of the lease being set for 
five years “and as long thereafter as oil or gas . . . are produced in paying 
quantities.”3  Such language is standard for a habendum clause4 in oil 
and gas leases.  Most lessors do not question Will when he reads the 
 
1. This hypothetical bares some inspiration from the movie Promised Land written by 
and starring Matt Damon and John Krasinski. PROMISED LAND, FOCUS FEATURES, 
http://www.focusfeatures.com/promised_land (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
2. David Levdansky, Oil and Gas Leases: A Guide for Pennsylvania Landowners, PA 
HOUSE, http://www.pahouse.com/pr/039-Leasing_NL.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (using 
industry jargon to describe an employee for an oil and gas company who negotiates leases 
with landowners). 
3. See, e.g., Multi-State Lease Form, KANES FORMS, http://kanesforms.com/forms-
programs/sample-forms-field-landman.html (follow “Pennsylvania Rental” hyperlink) (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2014).  In paying quantities is the pseudo-ambiguous phrase, the meaning of 
which is discussed in this Note. 
4. See generally JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUT SHELL 191 (4th ed. 2003) 
(“The habendum clause of an oil and gas lease, sometimes called the ‘term’ clause, sets the 
period of time for which the rights given in the granting clause will extend.”).   
Modern lease habendum clauses provide for a primary term and a secondary term.  
The primary term of an oil and gas lease is a fixed term of years during which the 
lessee has the right, without any obligation, to operate on the premises.  The 
secondary term is the extended period of time for which rights are granted to the 
lessee once production is obtained. 
Id. 
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lease to them.  After all, Will explains to the landowners how much 
money they stand to make in the lease and the landowner, 
understandably, wants the money to come in for as long as possible.  
Will explained to Jim that Good-Faith could offer him five dollars an 
acre-per-year rental fee plus a one-eighth royalty fee on all oil and gas 
produced from his land.5 
Two years after signing, no drilling, or oil or gas production had 
occurred on Jim’s land.  While he had not received any royalty 
payments, the rental fee alone helped him keep his farm out of the 
bank’s hands.  In the third year of the definite term of the lease, Good-
Faith drilled four traditional oil and gas wells.  Further, the company was 
able to produce a significant amount of natural gas in the first five years 
of drilling, providing Jim with nearly two million dollars in royalty 
payments.  Jim was thrilled with the money, going from a down-on-his-
luck farmer to an affluent landowner.  With the new money, Jim was 
able to fulfill his dream of buying dairy cows to show in competitions. 
After ten years, the wells on Jim’s land slowed in production, 
prompting Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. to fracture the wells to boost 
output.  Jim was unhappy about the hydraulic fracturing.  He had grown 
skeptical about the unknown effects that the chemicals in the hydraulic 
solutions may have on his farm.  The fracturing continued, apparently, 
without incident. 
Unfortunately, Jim’s prized show cow died after drinking water 
from a field near the farm’s fractured sites.6  Jim is not positive, but he 
believes his cow died from drinking a chemical in the fracturing solution 
on his land.  Compounding disappointment, the fourteenth year of 
production was an unsuccessful one for Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co., 
failing to produce a profit over their operating expenses.  After the first 
half of the fifteenth year, and an eighteen-month net loss, Good-Faith 
Oil and Gas Co. wanted to re-fracture the wells on Jim’s land and drill 
two new wells.  Jim—fearing for the lives of his show cows—opposed 
 
5. 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 33 (West 1979) (repealed 2013) (“A lease or other such 
agreement conveying the right to remove or recover oil, natural gas or gas of any other 
designation from lessor to lessee shall not be valid if such lease does not guarantee the lessor 
at lease [sic] one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or 
recovered from the subject real property.”).  The numbers used in the hypothetical are strictly 
fictitious but do represent an accurate example of the profit potential in a large tract of land in 
rural Pennsylvania.  See generally Oil and Gas Investing FAQ, BLACKBEARD DATA 
SERVICES, http://blackbearddata.com/oil-and-gas-royalties-what-they-are (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014). 
6. See Barry Estabrook, Fracking with Our Food: How Gas Drilling Affects Farming, 
GRIST (May 20, 2011, 12:48 AM), http://grist.org/natural-gas/2011-05-19-fracking-with-our-
food-how-gas-drilling-affects-farming/ (telling the story of Ken Jaffe, a cattle farmer from the 
Catskills in New York, with much hyperbole and fear mongering against “fracking”). 
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the most recent hydraulic fracturing.  He filed an injunction and an 
action to quiet title against Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.  Alleging the 
lease terminated after the fourteenth year’s failure to produce oil and gas 
in paying quantities, Jim believes Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. no longer 
has a right to produce oil and gas on his land. 
Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. believed the lease was still in effect 
because there were several successful months within the generally 
unprofitable last eighteen months.  They argue the land was producing 
marginally, and the lease, therefore, continues based only on their own 
subjective good faith.  There is no evidence indicating that Good-Faith is 
holding Jim’s lease just for speculation.  Further, Good-Faith alleges Jim 
only wants out of the original lease so he can renegotiate a higher rental 
fee to support his new lavish lifestyle. 
The jurisdiction that such a hypothetical is heard in may be 
determinative of the outcome.  The hypothetical interests at odds must 
all be properly factored into decisions relating to oil and gas law in 
Pennsylvania.7  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania failed to properly 
value the landowners’ interests in favor of protecting those of the oil and 
gas industry in the majority opinion of T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. 
Jedlicka.8  The imbalance will be shown through the lens of Jim versus 
Good-Faith. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania endeavored to bring 
the 1899 decision in Young v Forest Oil Co.9 into the twenty-first 
century via T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka.10  By implementing 
the good faith business judgment standard as the criterion for 
determining whether an oil and gas lease is producing “in paying 
quantities,” the court failed to heed guidance from oil and gas law 
developments in other producing states.11  The business judgment 
standard states that so long as an oil and gas company subjectively 
 
7. Jim, as the farm owner, and Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co., as the company trying to 
extract as much money as possible from the land while employing good people like Will, have 
serious interests in the proper handling of oil and gas litigation. 
8. 42 A.3d 261, 263 (Pa. 2012).  See Dale A. Tice, Opening Pandora's Box? Calling 
Shale Gas Rights into Question, THE PA. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 24, 24 (“As a general rule, 
lawyers like predictability and consistency in the law.  While there may be instances where 
ambiguity can create opportunities for creative lawyering, when it comes to black-letter 
property law, uncertainty is anathema for attorneys.  This is particularly true when lawyers are 
counseling clients regarding property as valuable as Marcellus Shale gas rights.”); see also 
State Natural Gas Act, S. 3437, 112th Cong. (as sponsored by Sen. Robert Casey Jr. [D-PA], 
referred to committee, July 25, 2012) (promoting natural gas production and development). 
9. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899).  Young was the first case to interpret the meaning of in paying 
quantities and has been the key authority on the subject since it was decided.  See infra Part. I. 
10. 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012). 
11. See id. at 276. 
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believes that it is continuing production activities for a profit, the lease 
will continue.12  Furthermore, the standard places an excessive burden of 
proof on a landowner attempting to terminate a lease due to unprofitable 
production.13  By enforcing such stringent requirements for terminating 
a lease, and incorporating a subjective good faith component, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania encourages a significant imbalance 
among various interests at odds in oil and gas lease litigation.  A test, 
like the “reasonably prudent operator standard,”14 would be more 
appropriate for regulating production quantities, and henceforth, 
promoting impartiality in assessment of oil and gas lease litigation.15  
The reasonably prudent operator standard is utilized in other states, 
which have found persuasive value in Young v Forest Oil Co.16 
This Note will examine how courts interpreted the term in paying 
quantities prior to Jedlicka.  It will further argue that the good faith 
business judgment standard was inappropriately included in the test for 
determining when an oil and gas lease is producing in paying quantities 
and thereby created indefinite terms in oil and gas leases.17  Part I 
describes the opinion of Young v. Forest Oil Co., which first decided the 
 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 272 (“[I]n assessing whether a lease is producing in paying quantities, Young 
places the principal focus on the good faith judgment of the operator.”). 
14. See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) (“In the case of a 
marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying quantities is determined is 
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator would, for 
the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in 
the manner in which the well in question was operated.”). 
15. The applicability of the term in paying quantities is imperative because 
Pennsylvania has a statutorily mandated minimum royalty clause.  58 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-
34 (West 2012).  As all Pennsylvania oil and gas leases must have a royalty clause, the 
cessation of production in the indeterminate period of a lease will result in termination.  See 
Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 793 (W.D. Pa. 2004).  “If any 
provisions in the lease make the value of the lease increase with production, then the duration 
of the lease during the secondary term is to be construed as contingent on production in 
paying quantities unless a clear intent to the contrary is expressed in the lease.” Id. (citing 
Clark v Wright, 166 A. 775, 776 (Pa. 1935) ("[L]ease obligating lessee to $300 per annum for 
each gas well from which gas is marketed made value of lease dependent upon marketing of 
gas and properly was interpreted by rules governing royalty-based leases.")). 
16. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899).  See, e.g., Koontz, 325 S.W.2d at 691 (holding if a well 
produces a profit over operating expenses it is producing in paying quantities, but in the case 
of a marginal well the reasonably prudent operator standard applies). 
17. Note that an oil and gas lease subject to an indefinite term such as so "long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities,” are in the nature of a fee simple 
determinable.  Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.  Therefore, while the reversionary event may or may 
not happen within twenty-one years, a fee simple determinable is not subject to the rule 
against perpetuities in Pennsylvania. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2006) 
(“Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities as 
measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in 
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void.”). 
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test for determining when a lease was producing in paying quantities.  
Part I.B is a case study of the language used in Young through decisions 
by other states in developing the reasonably prudent operator standard—
which this Note will argue is the proper test to analyze whether a well is 
producing in paying quantities.  Part II proposes that the good faith 
business judgment standard, imputed by the Jedlicka majority, makes 
the indefinite term in a habendum clause nearly impossible to terminate, 
creating an unwarranted and unfair balance among the interested parties. 
B.  Oil, Gas, and the Importance of Marcellus Shale 
Oil and gas leases are integral cogs in transitioning energy from an 
untapped resource in the ground to a fuel source heating Americans’ 
homes during cold winters.  Without proper law governing oil and gas 
leases the system cannot work efficiently.  While renewable energy is 
the likely future of the energy field, oil and natural gas are the 
champions of the present.18  The exponential growth of natural gas 
production can be seen in Pennsylvania thanks to the improved viability 
of Marcellus Shale.19  The increased production is significantly lowering 
the price of natural gas.20  These lower gas prices benefit homeowners 
who rely on natural gas to heat their homes.21  However, a by-product of 
the increased abundance of natural gas is an increased number of oil and 
gas leases.  This increase has, not surprisingly, led to a profusion of 
 
18. Tiffany Hsu, US to Become World’s Largest Oil Producer by 2020, IEA Says, L. A. 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-u.s.-oil-
producer-saudi-arabia-iea-20121112,0,6181922.story (“Recently . . . an ‘energy renaissance’ 
in the U.S. has caused a boost in oil, shale gas and bio-energy production due to new 
technologies such as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.  Fuel efficiency has improved in the 
transportation sector. The clean energy industry has seen an influx of solar and wind 
efforts.”). 
19. Horizontal Drilling Boosts Pennsylvania’s Natural Gas Production, U.S ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (May 23, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6390 
(“Between 2009 and 2011, Pennsylvania's natural gas production more than quadrupled due to 
expanded horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing.”).  Moreover, 
[t]he Marcellus Shale gas formation is rich in natural gas resources.  It is one of the 
largest shale regions in the United States; Marcellus shale and [sic] is estimated to 
be the second largest natural gas find in the world.  Stretching across New York, 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Maryland, the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) estimates the formation’s total area to be around 95,000 square 
miles, ranging in depth from 4,000 to 8,000 feet.  The 400 year-old rock Marcellus 
shale formation is estimated to contain more than 410 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas and could supply U.S. consumers’ energy needs for hundreds of years. 
Marcellus Shale, ENERGYFROMSHALE (June 30, 2012), http://www.energyfromshale.org/hyd 
raulic-fracturing/marcellus-shale-gas#sthash.L2Qx7KYM.dpuf. 
20. U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19. 
21. Id. 
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litigation.22  Until recently, oil and gas case law has remained stagnant in 
Pennsylvania, the first state with an oil well.23  Recent litigation over the 
leases in the state will further develop common law in oil and gas’s 
original home. 
While there are serious environmental concerns, hydraulic 
fracturing has significantly advanced drilling potential and gas 
production.24 
As a result of the growing use of hydraulic fracturing, natural gas 
production in the United States reached 21,577 billion cubic feet in 
2010, a level not achieved since a period of high natural gas 
production between 1970 and 1974.  Overall, the Energy 
Information Administration now projects that the United States 
possesses 2,552 trillion cubic feet of potential natural gas resources, 
enough to supply the United States for approximately 110 years.25 
Further, the method of hydraulic fracturing requires injecting fluid 
solutions into hard-to-reach domestic energy sources “to increase the 
permeability of the shale formation so that gas is able to migrate towards 
the well.”26  Of significant economic importance, the development of 
natural gas production within the Marcellus Shale formation may 
provide “employment gains [to more than] 280 thousand [workers] in 
2020.”27  The myriad interests at stake in oil and gas law must all be 
factored into decisions arising out of, and affecting, Marcellus Shale 
development. 
Oil and gas law in natural-gas-rich Pennsylvania cannot be 
discussed without addressing the serious environmental concerns 
 
22. See, e.g., Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (warning of lessees abusing the justice system in 
order to renegotiate lease terms). 
23. See Ross H. Pifer, Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case Law 
Upon the Sesquicentennial of the United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & 
ENERGY L. 47, 48 (2011) (“Despite early contributions to the national body of oil and gas law, 
the development of Pennsylvania oil and gas case law slowed considerably throughout the 
twentieth century, reflecting the relative decline of the industry in the state.”). 
24. See H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., CHEMICALS USED IN 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (Minority Staff) (April 2011), available at http://democrats.e 
nergycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Hydraulic-Fracturing-Chemicals-
2011-4-18.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
25. Id. 
26. How Hydraulic Fracturing Works, SWARTHMORE C., http://www.swarthmore.edu 
/academics/environmental-studies-capstone-/how-hydraulic-fracturing-works.xml (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014). 
27. TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA: A REPORT TO THE 
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE 33 (2010), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Fi 
les/Policy/Exploration/API-Economic-Impacts-Marcellus-Shale.ashx (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014). 
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surrounding hydraulic fracturing.  Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” is 
the process by which oil and gas companies pump pressurized liquid 
solutions into shale formations to free trapped natural gas.28  The process 
has increased the viability of shale formations such as the Marcellus 
Shale in Pennsylvania and neighboring states.29  The environmental 
impact from hydraulic fracturing is not fully known, but criticisms of 
what is known are abundant and popular.30  The facts oil and gas 
companies leave ambiguous about hydraulic fracturing are often the 
most worrisome.31  The House of Representatives Committee on Energy 
and Commerce Minority Staff reported, 
[i]n many instances, the oil and gas service companies were unable 
to provide . . . a complete chemical makeup of the hydraulic 
fracturing fluids they used.  Between 2005 and 2009, the companies 
used 94 million gallons of 279 products that contained at least one 
chemical or component that the manufacturers deemed proprietary or 
a trade secret.  Committee staff requested that these companies 
disclose this proprietary information.  Although some companies did 
provide information about these proprietary fluids, in most cases the 
companies stated that they did not have access to proprietary 
information about products they purchased “off the shelf” from 
chemical suppliers.  In these cases, the companies are injecting fluids 
containing chemicals that they themselves cannot identify.32 
The impact of hydraulic fracturing on water supplies has also 
inspired legislators to propose new laws hoping to limit harmful 
consequences.33  Understandably, anxieties over hydrofracking may 
justify a landowner trying to terminate an oil and gas lease.  In an effort 
to find a way out of such a lease, a landowner may look to a lack of 
production on the land as an avenue to get out of a now unfavorable 
agreement. 
The habendum clause’s inclusion of the term in paying quantities 
 
28. Hydraulic Fracturing-The State of the Science, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., 
http://www.usgs.gov/solutions/2012_june8.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
29. Id. 
30. Even celebrities have taken to the media in order to expound their critiques of the 
contentious practice.  See, e.g., Alec Baldwin, Fracking: What Cuomo Won’t (or Can’t) Tell 
You, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 25, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co 
m/alec-baldwin/fracking-natural-gas_b_1703190.html?utm_hp_ref=homepage (Alec Baldwin 
is an outspoken opponent of the fracking industry). 
31. See generally H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24. 
32. Id. 
33. FRAC Act, S. 587 and H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (referred to committee, March 15, 
2012) (while unlikely to be passed, the “Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of 
Chemicals Act of 2011 - Amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to repeal the exemption from 
restrictions on underground injection of fluids”). 
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requires definition in order for a landowner and oil and gas company to 
properly understand the contracts around which they act.  Courts in 
Pennsylvania and other states have tried to come up with a working 
definition of in paying quantities.34  Pennsylvania has failed to follow 
the beneficial guidance of other states. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW SURROUNDING THE PROPER 
INTERPRETATION OF WHEN OIL AND GAS IS PRODUCED IN PAYING 
QUANTITIES 
Analysis of the contractual phrase “in paying quantities” began in 
1899 with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Young v. 
Forest Oil Co.35  After discussing Young itself, Part I shows how sister 
states have utilized the language in Young to interpret “in paying 
quantities” to contain both an objective test and, in the case of marginal 
wells, a reasonably prudent operator standard.36  Finally, Part I offers a 
brief background to the 2012 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision in 
T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka.  Understanding the three 
opinions in the decision is critical to fathom the complexity of what in 
paying quantities means in an oil and gas lease.  The majority opinion, 
by Justice Todd, the concurring opinion, by Justice Eakin, and the 
dissenting opinion, by Justice Saylor, demonstrate the myriad of issues 
at stake when trying to calculate what it means for oil and gas to be 
produced in paying quantities.37 
A. The Language in Young v. Forest Oil Co. Supports the Application 
of Joint Objective and Subjective Test to Determine if Land is 
Producing “In Paying Quantities” 
The 1899 decision in Young v. Forest Oil Co. provided an early 
opportunity for interpreting the term “in paying quantities,” as it relates 
to oil and gas leases in the United States.38  The terminology used by the 
court lends support to both the proponents of the objective and 
subjective tests.  For example, the court’s favor of unambiguous plain 
language in contracts supports implementing a purely objective test.39 
 
34. See, e.g., T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012). 
35. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899). 
36. See infra Part. I.B. 
37. Ironically, the majority opinion noted that the leases are in the nature of a contract 
and must be interpreted based on the plain meaning of the terms, yet three opinions of the 
same court provided different meanings.  See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267. 
38. Young, 45 A. at 121-22. 
39. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing J.K. Willison v. 
Consol. Coal Co., 637 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa. 1994)) (A contract “must be construed in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed, and [t]he accepted and 
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The factual background in Young is an effective example of 
litigation over habendum clauses in oil and gas leases.  The lessor, 
Andrew B. Young, sought declaratory relief for forfeiture of an oil and 
gas lease alleging Forest Oil Company failed to develop land in 
accordance with the lease provisions.40  The oil and gas company 
developed and successfully produced oil from the western portion of the 
Young tract, but only perfunctorily tested the other sections to see if they 
too would produce in paying quantities.41  In deciding whether the 
failure to dig wells on the other portions of the land was a fraudulent act 
amounting to forfeiture of the lease, the court established the test for 
whether an oil and gas lease is producing “in paying quantities.”42 
The language of the test, which has also been popularly adopted in 
other states,43 prescribes, “if a well, being down, pays a profit[]—even a 
small one, over the operating expenses[]—it is producing in ‘paying 
quantities,’ though it may never repay its cost, and the operation as a 
whole may result in a loss.”44  Otherwise stated, the first component of 
the Young test operates as a conditional, mathematical test to see if a 
well is producing a profit over its operating expenses. The second Young 
component is bi-conditional: if and only if, in the case of marginal wells, 
a well is producing a profit over operating expenses, a court must decide 
whether a reasonably prudent operator would continue to produce for a 
profit. 
Notably, “operating expenses” refers to costs separate from the 
discovery, drilling, and beginning stages of an oil well.45  Operating 
expenses, therefore, are a fairly definite, or at least calculable, sum that 
can be factored into an algorithm establishing an objective test for 
whether a well is producing in paying quantities.46  Ambiguity naturally 
remains over the length of time necessary to compare operating expenses 
against the profits paid by a well.  For example, a well may be 
unprofitable in January and February and then have substantial profits in 
March and April; if the algorithm were to set the time variable at one 
month the lease would lapse, if longer then the lease would continue. 
 
plain meaning of the language used, rather than the silent intentions of the contracting parties, 
determines the construction to be given the agreement”). 
40. Young, 45 A. at 122. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. 1931); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 
545, 546 (Okla. 1954); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690-91 (Tex. 1959). 
44. Young, 45 A. at 122-23. 
45. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 657 (14th ed. 
2009) (referring instead to the “[e]xpenses incurred in the operation of a producing property”). 
46. Young, 45 A. at 122-23; Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 436 
(W. Va. 1903). 
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To reconcile the court’s disfavor with setting a bright-line time 
frame within the objective test,47 the court inserted language that appears 
to support principles favorable to parties who believe in a purely 
subjective test.48  Not all wells will produce as steadily in paying 
quantities as those at issue in Young.  Therefore it stands to reason, in 
the case of marginal wells that do not continuously and instantaneously 
produce above operating expenses, that it is proper to defer to a lessee’s 
better judgment.49  In Young, the production of the wells by the lessees 
never failed to produce “in paying quantities” over the period of one 
year.50  Arguably, while courts still disfavor a bright-line rule for the 
reasonable time over which to weigh the objective test, the subjective 
test should only be used in marginal cases when a reasonable time is 
untenable.51  In certain circumstances, a lessee may be willing to take a 
short-term loss in favor of an average net profit.  As seen in Young and 
Jedlicka, a few months of loss should not negate a profitable oil and gas 
lease.52 
Further, the pragmatic and market-focused reasoning of the Young 
court supports the subsequent reasoning used by Pennsylvania courts 
when interpreting oil and gas leases.  Recognizing the risks, investment, 
and long-term nature of oil and gas production, the court supported its 
conclusion with dicta, opining, 
[f]ew wells, except the very largest, repay cost under a considerable 
 
47. See Cassell v. Crothers, 44 A. 446, 446 (Pa. 1899) (refusing to use one-year as the 
bright-line, dispositive time frame); Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844, 848 (Kan. 1980) (“The 
arbitrary use of a short period of time while a well is down for a workover is obviously 
untenable.  On the other hand, the use of an unreasonably long period would entail using past 
glories during flush production to determine a lease’s present condition, which would give a 
distorted result not reflective of the current status of the lease.”). 
48. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 275 (Pa. 2012) (“An 
operator, exercising his good faith judgment, may be willing to wait longer for one lease to 
become 'profitable' than he is willing to wait for another well to become profitable, and unless 
it can be established that he is not acting in good faith on his business judgment, but instead is 
acting with fraudulent or dishonest intent, he does not forfeit his rights under the lease based 
on a difference in such judgment.”). 
49. Young, 45 A. at 122. 
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has put his money and 
labor into the undertaking, and is now called upon to determine whether it will pay 
to spend some thousands of dollars more in sinking another well to increase the 
production of the tract, is entitled to follow his own judgment.  If that is exercised in 
good faith, a different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or all 
combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree interfering with 
him. 
Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
52. See id. at 276-77. 
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time; many never do; but that is no reason why the first loss should 
not be reduced by profits, however small, in continuing to operate. 
The phrase ‘paying quantities,’ therefore, is to be construed with 
reference to the operator, and by his judgment when exercised in 
good faith.53 
The Young court understood that the realities of oil and gas 
production require some understanding that not all wells, even the most 
productive, are productive all the time.  This understanding led to a 
decision favoring objectivity but appreciating the need for flexibility 
with marginal wells. 
The two-step analysis outlined in Young limits the applicability of a 
subjective test, whenever possible, in favor of an objective test.  The 
Young court did not address what the subjective analysis should be in 
the case of a marginal well.  Other oil and gas producing states have 
added to Pennsylvania’s Young doctrine.54 
B. Other Oil and Gas Producing States Have Adopted Young, 
Advanced Young’s Reasoning, and Have Adopted the More 
Appropriate Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard 
Oil and gas law began in Pennsylvania after the first oil well was 
drilled on August 27, 1859.55  However, shortly after the Young 
decision,56 oil and gas law shifted its forum of development from 
Pennsylvania to twentieth century oil and gas powerhouses such as 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Kentucky.57  Despite the shift, and its nature as 
merely persuasive authority, Young remains effectively controlling to the 
extent that it is the analytical starting point for oil and gas law of the 
various states.58  Reaching a climax in the landmark case Clifton v. 
Koontz,59 Young’s progeny have retained the two-step process of a 
primary objective test, which, if met, triggers a subjective analysis for 
deciding whether a well is producing “in paying quantities.”60 
 
53. Young, 45 A. at 122-23; Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277-78. 
54. E.g., Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942). 
55. Pifer, supra note 23, at 48 (“On August 27, 1859, Colonel Edwin L. Drake drilled 
the first commercially successful oil well near Titusville, Pennsylvania.”). 
56. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also decided another case in 1899 pertaining to 
oil and gas law.  See Cassel v. Crothers, 44 A. 446 (Pa. 1899). 
57. See Pifer, supra note 23, at 48 (“Despite early contributions to the national body of 
oil and gas law, the development of Pennsylvania oil and gas case law slowed considerably 
throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the relative decline of the industry in the state.”). 
58. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 263 (Pa. 2012); Lowther 
Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 436 (W. Va. 1903). 
59. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959). 
60. See id. at 691; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. 1933) (“The term 
'paying quantities' is usually defined as being such quantities as will pay a profit, but at least 
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The language in Young has been used by a number of states61 
before finally culminating in the language’s inclusion in Koontz.  The 
notable language first appeared in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 
[i]t has been generally held that “paying quantities,” when used in 
this connection, means paying quantities to the lessee. If a well pays 
a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying 
quantities, though it may never repay its costs, and the enterprise as a 
whole may prove unprofitable.  Ordinarily, the phrase is to be 
construed with reference to the operator, and by his judgment when 
exercised in good faith.62 
In Marsh, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma calculated the profits and 
operating expenses of the Gypsy Oil Company to conclude that the 
Gypsy Oil Company was operating at a loss and therefore not acting in 
good faith by continuing to operate.63 
In determining the proper interpretation of what it was to produce 
in sufficient quantity, the court relied heavily on Young and its 
progeny.64  As seen earlier in Young, here, too, the court utilized the 
term “good faith” in its decision, but only in regards to the objective 
numbers, which proved the Gypsy Oil Company was not producing a 
profit over operating expenses.65  The language of Young survived in 
 
the cost of operating the well. . . . In determining whether or not a gas or oil well is productive 
to this extent, the judgment of an experienced operator or lessee, if exercised in good faith, 
will prevail as against that of a lessor without experience.”); Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, a Div. 
of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 869 P.2d 323, 327 (Okla. 1994) (reaffirming Stewart v. Amerada Hess 
Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979) (“In short, the lease continues in existence so long as the 
interruption of production in paying quantities does not extend for a period longer than 
reasonable or justifiable in light of the circumstances involved.  But under no circumstances 
will cessation of production in paying quantities ipso facto deprive the lessee of his extended-
term estate.”); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1954) (“We further held that the 
standard by which the judgment and good faith of the lessee is measured is whether the lease 
is producing, or by the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence could be made to produce, 
sufficient oil and gas to justify a reasonable and prudent operator in continuing the operation 
thereof.”); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Tex. 1942); see also Lowther, 44 S.E. at 
436 (“If the well pays a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying 
quantity, though it may never repay its cost, and the operation, as a whole, may result in a 
loss.  The phrase ‘paying quantities,’ therefore, is to be construed with reference to the 
operator and by his judgment, when exercised in good faith.”) (citing Young). 
61. See Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d at 31; Clay, 274 P.2d at 546; Clifton v. Koontz, 325 
S.W.2d 684 at 690-91 (Tx. 1959). 
62. 248 P. 329, 334 (Okla. 1926) (citing, inter alia, Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121 
(Pa. 1899)). 
63. Id.  The facts of Marsh pitted a landowner against an oil and gas company over a 
lease originally signed in 1919.  Marsh, who bought a right to the lease from the original 
lessor, claimed the lessee had failed to produce in sufficient quantity to continue the lease.  Id. 
at 330-31. 
64. Id. at 334. 
65. Id. 
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Marsh, showing other courts’ respect for the standard as laid out by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.66 
Extensively quoting Marsh and Young, Garcia v. King added a 
number of arguments in favor of the practical, even objective, 
interpretation of the term “in paying quantities.”67  First, in Garcia, the 
unprofitability of the wells during the secondary period of the lease was 
not marginal.68  Garcia involved a 7,500-acre tract that only paid the 
lessor royalty payments on production.69  The lease originally involved 
payment by rent until the lessee was unable to afford the original deal.70   
A court allowed the lease to continue via royalty payments, but after an 
eight month period of failed production the lessor sought to terminate 
the lease.71 
The Supreme Court of Texas found for the lessor.72  First, the court 
held that when the difference between the profits and operating expenses 
are substantial, there is no reason to utilize a subjective test to determine 
whether the wells were not producing in paying quantities.73  Second, 
the court added support to the argument that oil and gas lease disputes 
were to be interpreted practically for the purpose of securing the 
development of property to “the mutual benefit of” the land owner and 
the oil and gas company.74  Finally, “[t]he lessors should not be required 
to suffer a continuation of the lease after the expiration of the primary 
period merely for speculation purposes on the part of the lessees.”75  
Under a purely subjective test, continuing a lease for speculation 
purposes would be considered bad faith.  Garcia, however, did not 
prescribe a precedent doing away with the objective element outlined in 
Young but in fact proved the utility of a two-step procedure in 
determining if a well is producing in paying quantities.76 
 
66. While nearly nine decades old, Marsh is still good law. 
67. 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942). 
68. Compare id. at 512 (“[A]ll of the producing wells on the lease in question at the 
time of the termination of the primary period were not producing enough oil or gas to pay a 
profit over and above the cost of operating the wells. . . .”), with T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. 
v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. 2012) (“[I]n 1959, T.W. Phillips suffered a loss of 
approximately $40 as a result of operations under the Findley lease.”). 
69. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 509-10. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 512-13. 
73. Id. at 512.  Again, it is always important to reaffirm that “in paying quantities” is a 
contentious term because so long as a well is producing in paying quantities an oil and gas 
lease will continue.  See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267 (Pa. 2012) (citing Jacobs v. CNG 
Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (D. Pa. 2004)). 
74. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 512. 
75. Id. at 513 (in dicta). 
76. When a well does not even marginally produce at a profit greater than operating 
2014] NOT BALANCING WELL INTERESTS WELL 81 
The factual circumstances in Clifton v. Koontz77 parallel the 
difficulties of interpreting Young later faced in Jedlicka.78  In both 
Koontz and Jedlicka, a party challenged a marginal well and the 
reasonable time over which to weigh the profits and operating expenses 
was not readily apparent.79  Building on Garcia, the court in Koontz 
stated, 
[t]he underlying reason for [the Young definition of in paying 
quantities] appears to be that when a lessee is making a profit over 
the actual cash he must expend to produce the lease, he is entitled to 
continue operating in order to recover the expense of drilling and 
equipping, although he may never make a profit on the over-all 
operation.80 
The Koontz court looked at the purpose of the definition supplied in 
Young in order to provide the subjective second step that Young left 
ambiguous.81 
After weighing the interests of the lessor and lessee, the court 
confirmed that in the case of a marginal well the objective test 
necessitates a secondary subjective analysis.82  Naturally, the lessee 
should be entitled to seek a profit, but only in the case of a well 
producing, or marginally close to producing, in paying quantities.  
Therefore, to conclude that a well is in fact marginally close to 
producing in paying quantities, the Koontz court supplied the reasonably 
prudent operator standard to satisfy the subjective element alluded to by 
Young.83 
The reasonably prudent operator standard keeps the burden of proof 
with the party seeking to end the lease.  Moreover, under the reasonably 
prudent operator standard, “the standard by which paying quantities is 
 
expenses, there is no utility in looking at the subjective character of the lessee.  See Young v. 
Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899). 
77. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959). 
78. 42 A.3d at 271-72. 
79. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d. at 688-89 (“Petitioners base their contention that the well had 
ceased to produce in paying quantities upon the showing that for the period of time from June, 
1955 through September, 1956, the income from the lease was $3,250 and that the total 
expense of operations during the same period was $3,466.16–thus, a loss of $216.16 for the 
sixteen months' period selected by petitioners.  During the period of time indicated, some 
months showed a gain and some a loss.”). 
80. Id. at 692. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 691. 
83. Id. (“In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which 
paying quantities is determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a 
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for 
speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which the well in question was 
operated.”). 
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determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a 
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit 
and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner 
in which the well in question was operated.”84  Therefore, to prove a 
reasonably prudent operator would not continue to produce a marginal 
well, a lessor may supply experts and expert testimony.85 
Starting with the same precedent at issue in Jedlicka and Young, 
sister states, including Texas and Oklahoma, have advanced oil and gas 
law throughout the twentieth century by creating the reasonably prudent 
operator standard.86  With an appreciation for the ambiguities left by 
Young, in the case of a marginal well, the reasonably prudent operator 
standard emerged naturally during the twentieth century.87  The resulting 
standard allows landowners to use the court system to their benefit and 
does not insulate corporations from legitimate claims.  The reasonably 
prudent operator standard would also support a landowner like Jim in his 
litigation against Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.88 
Indeed, the language supporting the objective test, described as the 
primary step in determining if a well is producing in paying quantities in 
Koontz, was directly traceable to Young, via Marsh and Garcia.89  
Logically, then, there is great support for the argument that Young 
prescribed a two-step analysis in determining whether or not a well is 
producing “in paying quantities”—rather than a test only focused on 
subjective good faith.90  Young’s progeny, especially Garcia and Koontz, 
filled in the ambiguity left by Young in 1899.  The objective test should 
be applied when the well either clearly produced a profit greater than 
operating expenses or clearly produced a profit short of operating 
expenses.91  When the objective test is inconclusive or there is not a 
reasonable time over which to weigh the profits and costs—a marginal 
well—the reasonably prudent operator standard governs.92 
Contrary to other states’ development of oil and gas lease law 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id.; Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1954) (“We further held that the 
standard by which the judgment and good faith of the lessee is measured is whether the lease 
is producing, or by the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence could be made to produce, 
sufficient oil and gas to justify a reasonable and prudent operator in continuing the operation 
thereof.”); Garcia v. King, 67 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Tex. 1942).  
87. See cases cited supra note 86. 
88. See supra Introduction, A. 
89. See Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329, 334 (Okla. 1926); Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 
513. 
90. Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899). 
91. See Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 513. 
92. See Koontz, 325 S.W.2d at 691. 
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during the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
developed a purely subjective test and, in effect, insulated oil and gas 
companies from unwanted lease termination based on lack of 
production.93 
C. The Jedlicka Court Instilled a Good Faith Business Judgment 
Standard but not Without Confusion and Dissent 
In Jedlicka, the lessor, Jedlicka, owned a tract of land within a 
larger tract conveyed to T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Company by a 1928 
oil and gas lease (the “Findley Lease”).94  Along with an explanation of 
royalty payment clauses, the Findley Lease contained a habendum 
clause.95  The habendum clause provided, 
[t]o have and to hold the above-described premises for the sole and 
only purpose of drilling and operating for oil and gas with the 
exclusive right to operate for same for the term of two years, and as 
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities. . . 96 
The term “in paying quantities” is not outlined or defined within the 
Findley Lease, but it was written in accordance with Young.97  One year 
after signing, the Lessee drilled four gas wells on the Lessor’s expanse, 
followed by four more wells after the original four were fractured.98  The 
second set of four wells was drilled subsequent to a conveyance by T.W. 
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. (“T.W. Phillips”) to PC Exploration in 2004.99  
PC Exploration wanted to drill four more wells on the Jedlicka tract after 
the 2004 wells were completed.100  Jedlicka objected to the final set of 
four wells opining the Findley Lease was no longer valid because T.W. 
Phillips failed to produce oil or gas in paying quantities in 1959.101  
Specifically, Jedlicka maintained Lessee suffered a forty-dollar loss in 
1959, terminating the lease and creating a tenancy at will.102 
On April 16, 2007, the case was heard before a trial court that 
found for the lessees based on the oil and gas company's good faith in 
continuing to produce oil and gas before, throughout, and subsequent to 
 
93. See infra Part II.C-D. 
94. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 263-64 (Pa. 2012). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
97. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899); see Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
98. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 267. 
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1959.103  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.104  Jedlicka appealed, 
and in 2009 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed to review de 
novo the question: “[d]id the Superior Court misapply the decision of 
this Court in Young v. Forest Oil Co.,105 by holding that Pennsylvania 
employs a purely subjective test to determine whether an oil or gas lease 
has produced in paying quantities.”106 
The majority107 affirmed, deciding that the purely subjective test 
applied by the trial court was the correct interpretation of Young.108  The 
majority outlined the legal arguments of both sides in order to show the 
clear divide in the interpretations applied by each party, respectively.109  
Then, citing several decisions from other jurisdictions, the majority 
concluded that a purely objective test, as Jedlicka argued for, is not 
workable without a set and reasonable time period within which to 
measure production.110  Finally, the court claimed to create a two-step 
interpretation of Young while actually creating an entirely new good 
faith business judgment standard.111  First, this new interpretation  
requires a determination of whether the lessee produces a profit, no 
matter how small, over the operating expenses.  It then requires a 
determination of whether the well objectively produces “in paying 
quantities.”112  Second, if the well does not produce a profit over 
operating expenses, then the court must look to the subjective good faith 
management of the lessee in operating the well at a loss.113  The majority 
acknowledged that interpreting the habendum clause to protect the lessee 
is contrary to the original purpose of such clauses but found the new 
interpretation in line with Young and an unambiguous reading of the 
language.114 
 
103. Id. at 265 (“[N]otwithstanding the $40 loss suffered in 1959, Appellees had 
produced gas on their leasehold in paying quantities, and, therefore, [] the Findley lease 
remained in effect.  In determining that Appellees produced gas in paying quantities, the trial 
court relied on this Court's 1899 decision in Young v. Forest Oil, wherein we held that 
consideration should be given to a lessee's good faith judgment when determining whether oil 
was produced in paying quantities.”). 
104. Id. at 266. 
105. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899). 
106. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266 (internal quotations omitted).  See also T.W. Phillips Gas 
and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 978 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
107. The Majority opinion was written by Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Castille 
and Justices Baer and McAffrey. 
108. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 274-75. 
109. Id. at 270-71. 
110. Id. at 275. 
111. Id. at 276. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 271 (noting habendum clauses were originally meant to protect lessors). 
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In an exceptionally short concurring opinion, Justice Eakin 
highlighted the shortsightedness of the majority opinion.  Justice Eakin 
iterated that a habendum clause may be "a shield or a sword," for the 
parties entering into an oil and gas lease.115  The majority opinion, 
however, only allows a habendum clause to be used as a shield by the 
lessee.116  Further, underscored throughout the opinions in Jedlicka is the 
real difference between the uses of habendum clauses now and when 
Young was decided in 1899.117  Rather than supporting the majority’s 
mistaken harmonization of the good faith standard and the reasonably 
prudent operator standard, Justice Eakin found discussion of the 
reasonably prudent operator standard “inapposite to this lease.”118  
Justice Eakin saw through the pretense of Lessors’ claims but was 
unable to prevent the misbalancing applied by the majority.119 
Justice Saylor, the lone dissenter, argued that the majority and the 
trial court misapplied the Young decision and created a purely subjective 
test.120  He opined that Young prescribed a hybrid two-pronged test, but 
the proper analysis is hinged on the threshold objective question of 
whether the lessee was producing a profit over the operating expenses.121  
Only if the critical first prong is met should the court analyze the 
subjective good faith of the operating lessee.122  This argument hinges, 
importantly, on the original purpose of the habendum clause in 1928—to 
protect the lessor from unfair speculation by the lessee.123  Justice Saylor 
stated that the proper interpretation of the language in Young allows for 
reference to a lessee’s good faith because there are wells that, while 
producing at a very small profit, will never cover their original 
expenses.124  Contrary to the Jedlicka majority’s opinion, Young 
conceivably created narrower circumstances through which a lease may 
extend indefinitely.125  Justice Saylor, in effect, argued the reference to 
 
115. Id. at 278 (Eakin, J., concurring). 
116. Id. at 271(majority opinion). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 278 (Eakin, J., concurring). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 278-79 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 279. 
122. Id. 
123. Id.  But cf. id. at 277 (noting that, currently, habendum clauses are being used by 
lessors to end otherwise profitable wells). 
124. Id. at 282 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
125. Justice Saylor believes Young created a narrower interpretation of “in paying 
quantities,” rather than the expanded one used by the majority in Jedlicka.  Id. at 279 (“The 
objective and threshold element is that profits must exceed operating expenses, i.e., that the 
well must be at least marginally profitable.  If profits exceed operating expenses, then the 
subjective component—the lessee's good-faith judgment—comes into play.  In those 
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good faith comes into play if a well is producing in paying quantities 
over operating expenses, but the lessee in good faith could allow a lease 
to terminate.126  According to Justice Saylor, the reference to good faith 
was meant to allow a lessee to terminate a productive lease more easily 
rather than retain an unproductive agreement.127 
Further, Justice Saylor argued that the reasonably prudent operator 
standard implemented in other states was incorporated into the majority 
decision.128  Justice Saylor seemed to imply that the majority might have 
tried, and failed, to implement the reasonably prudent operator standard 
from other jurisdictions.129  While Justice Saylor believed the reasonably 
prudent operator standard might be appropriate for Pennsylvania, he 
acknowledged that the narrow issue on appeal was whether the trial 
court interpreted Young correctly.130  Finally, Justice Saylor differed 
from the majority's belief that the subjective good faith standard applied 
in the present case was harmonious with the reasonably prudent operator 
standard as applied in other jurisdictions.131 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania read, cited to, and appreciated 
the value of other states’ development of the test to determine when a 
well is producing in paying quantities.132  Despite this, the justices 
misinterpreted the delicate differences between the good faith business 
judgment standard and the reasonably prudent operator standard 
designed in other states.133  The reasonably prudent operator standard 
created an avenue for landowners to terminate unproductive leases held 
onto by speculating oil and gas lease companies.  The good faith 
business judgment standard insulates oil and gas companies from 
termination so long as they maintain the appearance of good faith.  The 
result of Jedlicka, therefore, is an unfair burden on landowners when 
trying to end an unproductive or even harmful lease. 
 
instances, it should be presumed that the lessee is operating the lease in good faith, and unless 
the lessor rebuts this presumption, the lease is said to be producing in ‘paying quantities.’”). 
126. Id. at 278-79. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 282 (Saylor, J., dissenting).  This Note refutes this premise based on affect.  
In reality, the Majority Justices may have contemplated other states’ persuasive authority.  If 
they did, they misinterpreted the reasonably prudent operator standard. 
129. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 282. 
130. Id.  See also id. at 270 n.11 (“Jedlicka emphasizes she is not suggesting that Young 
be overruled.  Indeed, she states: [t]o be abundantly clear, [Jedlicka] is not advocating that this 
Court overturn Young .... It has always been [Jedlicka's] contention that Young was properly 
decided ... and should, therefore, be affirmed and applied to this case.”). 
131. Id. at 285 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
132. See id. at 268-76. 
133. See id. 
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II. THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
STANDARD TEST CREATED BY THE JEDLICKA MAJORITY IMPROPERLY 
BALANCES THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 
Under the good faith business judgment standard for determining 
whether a well is producing “in paying quantities,” a landowner may 
only be released from an unprofitable lease by proving a lessee’s bad 
faith.134  With the burden on the landowner, lessees are essentially 
shielded from petitions alleging unprofitable production.  If a landowner 
brings a petition against a lessee alleging bad faith, the landowner will 
not be able to present evidence to a jury since bad faith is nearly 
impossible to prove outside hypothetical realms.135 
While the standard used in Jedlicka places a substantial burden on 
plaintiffs, an argument in favor of the Jedlicka test may be that keeping 
juries from deciding when a lease is producing in paying quantities is a 
protection from local bias leading to arbitrary findings for local 
landowners.  Such an argument overestimates the likelihood of abuse 
under the reasonably prudent operator standard.  When the potential 
worst-case scenarios of the good faith business judgment standard and 
the reasonably prudent operator standard are compared, the reasonably 
prudent operator standard is superior. 
This Part proposes that the good faith business judgment standard 
imputed by the Jedlicka majority makes the indefinite term in a 
habendum clause nearly impossible to terminate, and notes that the good 
faith business judgment standard prevents juries from deciding when a 
well is profitably producing oil and/or natural gas.  This Part then 
extrapolates from the procedural problems that Jedlicka creates for 
lessors, and weighs the reasonably prudent operator standard and the 
good faith business judgment standard, finding the former to be the 
lesser of two evils.  Finally, this Part lays out a framework that applies to 
landowners considering their options before entering into an oil and gas 
lease in this post-Jedlicka era. 
A. The Landowner’s New Obligation to Prove Bad Faith 
The shift in the burden of proof from the reasonably prudent 
operator to the good faith business judgment standard changes the 
procedural posture of potential future litigation.  The common law 
definition of bad faith will likely be enough to prove a lessee was not 
continuing production in good faith.136  Therefore, plaintiffs may be 
 
134. See id. at 276. 
135. See generally Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director's Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 
457, 462 (2007). 
136. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). 
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entitled to relief if they are able to prove that an oil and gas company 
purposely continued production with an actual intent to do harm to the 
agreement or land.  Proving bad faith requires direct evidence of malice 
or incredibly culpable negligence.137 
As a result of the high burden of proof necessary to find bad faith, 
circumstantial evidence is not enough to find liability or even get to a 
jury.138  Even with a team of experienced lawyers and favorable 
discovery decisions, to be successful, a plaintiff would have to find the 
metaphorical “smoking gun” or present candid testimony, which 
amounts to a confession of intentional bad faith.139  Moreover, a plaintiff 
would have to find sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary 
judgment prior to contemplating trial.140 
The only realistic way for a landowner to successfully prove a 
lessee’s bad faith would be to find evidence of the oil and gas company 
continuing a lease solely for speculation purposes.141  The purpose of an 
oil and gas lease is to provide an opportunity for two parties to exploit a 
resource that would not be reachable without the cooperative 
agreement.142  If a lessee continues a lease for the purpose of 
speculation, i.e. in order to prevent a competitor from benefitting, he or 
 
137. Id. 
138. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Two working principles underlie 
our decision in Twombly.  First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.  Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) 
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
139. See id. 
140. PA. R. CIV. P. § 1035.2 (2012). 
141. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) (“In the case of a 
marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying quantities is determined is 
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator would, for 
the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in 
the manner in which the well in question was operated.”); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 
513 (Tex. 1942) (“The lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after 
the expiration of the primary period merely for speculation purposes on the part of the 
lessees.”); see also 3-6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.5 (2001) 
(“Pennsylvania has reaffirmed its commitment to the subjective 'good faith' standard in 
determining whether or not there is production in paying quantities.  The lessor bears the 
burden of establishing a lack of good faith and the mere showing that there was a monetary 
loss in one year will not survive a motion for summary judgment requested by the lessee.”). 
142. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. 2012) (“To 
have and to hold the above-described premises for the sole and only purpose of drilling and 
operating for oil and gas with the exclusive right to operate for same for the term of two years, 
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, or operations for oil or gas 
are being conducted thereon, including the right to drill other wells.”) (citing Lease, July 2, 
1928, at 1 (R.R. at 13a–14a)); Rachel L. Allen & Scotland M. Duncan, The Standard Oil and 
Gas Lease - and Why it is Not, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 155, 166 (2011) (“The granting of an oil and 
gas lease carries with it the implied right to use as much of the surface area as is reasonably 
necessary for the purposes specified in the lease.” (emphasis added)). 
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she would be acting contrary to the purpose of the original oil and gas 
lease.  It would be nonsensical for a marginal oil and gas lease to 
continue indefinitely, based on producing “in paying quantities,” for a 
purpose other than for the mutual benefit of both parties.  Evidencing 
bad faith requires a party proving the intent of the other party in 
continuing production.  Logically, the intentions of a lessee can only be 
established from the words or writings of the lessee. 
A pro-industry argument may be that an oil and gas company has 
no interest in continuing a lease that is not producing in paying 
quantities.  However, such an argument fails to factor in the value of 
speculation.  When weighing the shortcomings of a purely subjective 
interpretation of in paying quantities, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
noted, a lessee: 
may consider it to be to his economic advantage to continue a 
marginal or losing operation in order to take advantage of possibile 
[sic] discoveries in formations other than the formation from which 
he is producing.  He may also anticipate a change in marketing 
conditions or market prices of oil or gas.  There may also be other 
circumstances which indicate to him that a current operating loss 
may eventually be turned into a profit in the long run.143 
The increased supply of natural gas has significantly lowered 
natural gas prices; as a result some producers are holding back on their 
production rates in order to control the supply.144  A lessee, in his or her 
business judgment, may benefit from the continuation of a lease for 
purely speculative purposes.145  The benefit, however, is not in the best 
interest of the landowner. 
If a lessee continues production for speculation purposes the lease 
is not continuing for the benefit of both parties.  Therefore, if a lessee is 
purely speculating during the indeterminate period of the lease, he or she 
is continuing production in bad faith.  Accordingly, even under the good 
faith business judgment standard imputed by the Jedlicka majority,146 a 
lessee’s continued production for speculative purposes would terminate 
the indefinite term of an oil and gas lease.  Unfortunately, the 
opportunity to prove the bad faith may be illusory. 
 
143. Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 897 (Kan. 1976). 
144. Marc Levy, Associated Press,  Fracking for Natural Gas Being Powered by it, 
Too, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 20, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/fracking-natural-gas-
being-powered-170628804.html (“Production has increased so much that natural gas has 
flooded the market, dragging down prices and forcing companies to pull back on their plans to 
expand drilling while looking for new ways to use gas.”). 
145. Reese, 553 P.2d at 897. 
146. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266-67. 
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B. Landowners Lack Access to the Jury on Questions of Bad Faith 
A landowner must prove bad faith to be relieved from an oil and 
gas lease with a term clause similar to “for as long as oil or gas is 
produced in paying quantities.”  As established supra, only with clear 
proof can a landowner prove bad faith.  In the unlikely event a lessor has 
sufficient proof to win at trial, he or she would win on summary 
judgment without the need for a jury.147  What the Jedlicka majority has 
essentially created is a system where, in the case of a marginal well, the 
lessee is protected from termination so long as production continues and 
no outward evidence of bad faith exists.  The burden of proof is so high 
that for a landowner to be successful in defeating summary judgment he 
or she must prove bad faith, and any proof of bad faith would be 
sufficient for the landowner to win on his or her own motion for 
summary judgment.  In Pennsylvania there is currently no discretion for 
a jury to decide when an oil and gas company is continuing production 
of a marginal lease in good faith.148 
Returning to the hypothetical of Jim’s lease with Good-Faith Oil 
and Gas Co., the difficulty created by Jedlicka is apparent.  If Jim lives 
in Pennsylvania and believes Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. is continuing 
to produce oil and gas from his land even though the company knows its 
operating expenses will be greater than the profits produced, Jim’s 
burden of proof is exceptionally high.  Jim may find multiple experts in 
the oil and gas producing field who strongly believe that Good-Faith is 
holding on to Jim’s lease in order to use improved technology and higher 
prices in the future to make Jim’s land profitable.  However, in 
Pennsylvania, they cannot testify to a jury to that effect absent separate 
evidence of bad faith.  In Pennsylvania, the court will defer to the good 
faith business judgment of the lessee that Good-Faith is continuing 
 
147. In a recent 2013 motion for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6), the Middle District of Pennsylvania both extended and limited the good faith 
standard outlined in Jedlicka.  Stewart v. SWEPI, LP, No. 4:11-CV-2241, 2013 WL 170181 
(D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2013).  In Stewart, the lessor is seeking to terminate his lease alleging that the 
lessee built a well for the sole purpose of continuing a lease for speculation purposes.  Id.  The 
federal court found that the well being built very recently before the lease was due to expire 
was constructed “solely for the purpose of extending the lease,” that the lessee had done 
nothing to produce oil or gas since, and that there were facts sufficient to deny the lessee’s 
motion to dismiss.  Id.  At least in one federal court obvious facts of speculation have been 
sufficient to aver the bad faith requirement imputed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Jedlicka.  Id.  Also, the court in Stewart applied the good faith standard outside the factual 
confines of a lease containing the production in paying quantities language and in effect 
extended the applicability of Jedlicka.  Id.  Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the 
plaintiffs in Stewart were able to plead sufficient circumstantial inferences of bad faith; there 
is no reference to whether the plaintiffs would be able to prove the alleged bad faith. 
148. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266-67. 
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production for present profit.149  Therefore, unless Will provided Jim 
with evidence that Good-Faith was continuing production at a loss 
strictly for speculation purposes, which is highly unlikely, Jim will be 
unable to prove bad faith. 
Also, note that if Will was able to provide Jim with sufficient 
evidence to successfully allege bad faith, such evidence would be 
sufficient to win on summary judgment.150  It is important to remember, 
however, that oil and gas companies are sophisticated business 
organizations, likely with expensive and talented lawyers, rendering the 
discovery of evidence establishing bad faith incredibly unlikely.  In sum, 
Jedlicka has ultimately created an inequitable system where a lease will 
continue until the oil and gas company wants it to end. 
C. Hindering Landowner Rights to Avoid Local Bias? 
Jedlicka is illustrative of the typical way that a landowner will 
bring suit against a lessee.151  Petitioner, Jedlicka, brought the action, 
which was originally decided by the court of proper jurisdiction in the 
county where Jedlicka’s tract was located.152  A charge against the 
reasonably prudent operator standard might be that it puts too much 
power in the hands of juries in deciding valuable leases.  The fear is 
compounded by lease disputes being decided in the jurisdiction 
containing the leased property.153  Many of the counties in Northern and 
Central Pennsylvania, which are regions within the Marcellus Shale 
formation, are less populated than the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia 
areas.154  Critics of the reasonably prudent operator standard, and the 
Jedlicka majority, may fear small town juries arbitrarily supporting their 
 
149. Id. at 276-77 (“Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or sporadic, 
such that, over some period, the well's profits do not exceed its operating expenses, a 
determination of whether the well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration of 
the operator's good faith judgment in maintaining operation of the well.  In assessing whether 
an operator has exercised his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must consider the 
reasonableness of the time period during which the operator has continued his operation of the 
well in an effort to reestablish the well's profitability.”). 
150. PA. R. CIV. P. 1035.2 (2012). 
151. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264-66. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Law firms have interpreted Jedlicka on their websites. See, e.g., Nathaniel I. 
Holland, Know How: PA Supreme Court Affirms Good Faith Test of Production in Paying 
Quantities, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.steptoe-johnson.com/content/ 
pa-supreme-court-affirms-good-faith-test-production-paying-quantities (“[The Jedlicka] 
opinion is notable for a number of reasons: 1) it reaffirms the longstanding rule that the lessee 
is in the best position to make business decisions regarding its leases, which should not be 
second guessed absent evidence of an illicit intent.”) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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neighbors, or purposely injuring large corporate lessees.155 
Those who support the Jedlicka good faith business judgment rule 
will argue that the good faith standard still allows a potential process for 
relief.156  If a landowner has actual proof of bad faith through motives of 
pure speculation then he or she is entitled to re-lease.  Therefore, it can 
be argued that it was not worth lowering the burden of proof for a 
landowner to end a lease if there is the potential risk of an arbitrary 
judgment. 
A jury may rely on any evidence or expert testimony presented at 
trial when making decisions of fact.  Further, understanding what a jury 
chooses to believe is an exercise for mystics.  Fear of arbitrary judgment 
against an oil and gas company is a legitimate interest that must be 
balanced in establishing a test for whether a lease is producing in paying 
quantities.  When compared to the problems that arise from the good 
faith business judgment standard—however—the concerns with the 
reasonably prudent operator standard are trivial. 
D. The Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard is the Lesser of Two 
Evils 
Both the good faith business judgment and the reasonably prudent 
operator standards fail to completely insulate the lessor and lessee from 
abuse by the other party.  Under the reasonably prudent operator 
standard, a lessee may suffer an arbitrary decision by a locally biased 
jury ending a long-term profitable lease.157  Under the good faith 
business judgment standard, a lessor may be trapped in an unprofitable 
lease simply because there is not sufficient evidence to allege bad 
faith.158  In properly balancing the interests of the lessor and lessee, the 
good faith business judgment standard is more harmful than the 
reasonably prudent operator standard, based on both the likelihood and 
scale of potential detriment. 
Recall the difficulty Jim faced under the good faith business 
judgment standard hypothetical.  In Pennsylvania, the court will defer to 
the good faith business judgment of the lessee that Good-Faith Oil and 
 
155. David Bowen, Gunned Down – By the Law: Foreign Firms Can Be Soft Targets in 
the ‘Jackpot’ Mentality of US Litigation, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 16, 1997), http://www.inde 
pendent.co.uk/news/business/gunned-down--by-the-law-1278866.html (“It is perhaps too easy 
to drum up an image of xenophobic rednecks determined to kick foreign butt, but it is 
undoubtedly true that small-town juries will give the home team an advantage . . . . [m]y 
advice is to avoid a jury trial, especially if you’re a foreigner going up against a local 
company.”). 
156. See generally Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 275-77. 
157. Bowen, supra note 155. 
158. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 276-77. 
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Gas Co. is continuing production for present profit.159  Therefore, unless 
an unlikely situation occurs, like Will providing Jim with evidence that 
Good-Faith was continuing production at a loss strictly for speculation 
purposes, Jim will be unable to demonstrate bad faith.  Further, oil and 
gas companies are sophisticated business organizations, and finding 
evidence of bad faith is incredibly unlikely.  Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. 
is essentially allowed to continue an oil and gas lease indefinitely so 
long as they continue production under the pretense of good faith profit 
seeking. 
Jim believes his prized show cows are dying from the run-off of the 
hydraulic fracturing solution containing toxic chemicals.  He does not 
have strict evidentiary support for his allegation so he cannot sue for 
damages or end the lease based on waste.160  Thinking he could take 
advantage of the sporadic unprofitability of the wells on his land, Jim 
attempted to assert that the indefinite term of the lease had ended 
because it was no longer producing “in paying quantities.”  In 
Pennsylvania, with deference to Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.’s alleged 
good faith, Jim cannot terminate his lease.  Even with a number of 
experts supporting Jim’s position—that the oil and gas in his land has 
been extracted to the point it is no longer profitable to continue 
production—potentially harmful hydraulic fracturing will endure. 
The prospective shortcomings of the good faith business judgment 
standard trap a landowner in an indefinite lease subject to the whims of 
the oil and gas-producing lessee.  Such a result is contrary to the 
originally agreed upon purposes of the lease.161  Further, the Jedlicka 
majority acknowledged that interpreting the habendum clause to protect 
the lessee is contrary to the original purpose of such clauses.162 
When compared to the harms of the good faith business judgment 
standard, the deficiencies of the reasonably prudent operator standard 
appear trivial.  Suppose Jim’s real purpose for trying to assert his lease 
 
159. Id. (“Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or sporadic, such that, 
over some period, the well's profits do not exceed its operating expenses, a determination of 
whether the well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration of the operator's 
good faith judgment in maintaining operation of the well.  In assessing whether an operator 
has exercised his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must consider the 
reasonableness of the time period during which the operator has continued his operation of the 
well in an effort to reestablish the well's profitability.”). 
160.  H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24, at 2 (“Although some 
companies did provide information about these proprietary fluids, in most cases the 
companies stated that they did not have access to proprietary information about products they 
purchased ‘off the shelf’ from chemical suppliers.”). 
161. Allen & Duncan, supra note 142, at 166. 
162. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 271 (noting habendum clauses were originally meant to 
protect lessors). 
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with Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. is not to protect his prized show cows.  
Jim has met other farmers whose leases are more financially favorable to 
the lessor.  Perhaps, as Good-Faith would likely argue, the reason for 
Jim’s suit is really an attempt to renegotiate for a more favorable lease.  
Indeed, the justices hearing the Jedlicka appeal acknowledged that many 
landowners in Pennsylvania are trying to get out of their original leases 
to renegotiate for more favorable terms.163  Compounding potential harm 
of the reasonably prudent operator standard is a possibility when local 
juries might arbitrarily find in favor of local landowners based on local-
bias.164  Plainly, there is a potential tangible impairment created by using 
the reasonably prudent operator standard as the test for when a marginal 
well is producing in paying quantities.  The test inevitably devolves into 
a question of which is worse: for a large oil and gas corporation to 
renegotiate, or a landowner to be trapped in an unfavorable, or even 
harmful, oil and gas lease. 
While this Note argues that the disadvantages of the good faith 
business judgment standard are more detrimental than the reasonably 
prudent operator standard, it still acknowledges the fear of arbitrary jury 
findings as a legitimate concern.  The likely prevalence of each 
respective harm should prove that the reasonably prudent operator 
standard is the more beneficial outlet.  The likelihood of a jury actually 
shirking its duties and arbitrarily finding for its members’ neighbors is 
slight.165  Further, while appellate courts are likely to give findings of 
fact due deference, they still provide corporations with an avenue of 
redress for legal errors.166  The more prudent justice system will shift the 
difficult burden of proof from the farmer to the wealthy corporation 
capable of affording the best lawyers money can buy. 
Further, the underlying purpose of oil and gas leases—mutual gain 
from untapped resources—must shape the outcome of all litigation 
arising from such leases.  Under the reasonably prudent operator 
 
163. Id. at 277 (“Consideration of the operator's good faith judgment in determining 
whether a well has produced in paying quantities, however, also protects a lessee from lessors 
who, by exploiting a brief period when a well has not produced a profit, seek to invalidate a 
lease with the hope of making a more profitable leasing arrangement.”). 
164. Bowen, supra note 155. 
165. See Newton N. Minow, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 633 (1991) (“Courts employ a variety of techniques in their attempt to 
minimize the partiality problem.  The technique most heavily relied upon is the voir dire 
process, by which lawyers and judges question potential jurors to determine bias.”); see also 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (“[I]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.") (citing 
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)). 
166. See generally Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 263-64 (the procedural history of Jedlicka 
shows the appellate courts’ willingness to review findings of oil and gas leases). 
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standard, if a well were only marginally producing and a reasonably 
prudent operator standard would continue production for a profit, the 
lease would continue to the honest benefit of both parties.  On the other 
hand, if a reasonably prudent operator would only hold onto a tract of 
land for speculation purposes, then the mutual benefit that served as 
consideration for the original lease would be terminated.  The lease, too, 
should then terminate.  Should the parties come to an appropriate 
arrangement recognizing the speculation, then a new lease may be 
drafted based on the new purpose.  An oil and gas lease is in the nature 
of a contract.167  Without sufficient consideration, a contract for the use 
of land should not be equitably enforced.168  An indefinite lease subject 
to a “thereafter” term in a habendum clause is arguably similar to an 
employment-at-will where agreement for the next day’s work is based 
on appropriate ongoing consideration.169 
When balancing the interests involved in an oil and gas lease, the 
addition of a subjective element necessarily leaves the door open for 
abuse by one party or another.  Under the reasonably prudent operator 
standard, the abuse likely feared is that a landowner will take advantage 
of technical language and a favorable jury makeup to end a lease 
prematurely.  This is a realistic fear because of the favorable possibilities 
renegotiation provides for a lessor.170  However, the tools still available 
to an oil and gas company under the reasonably prudent operator 
standard—sophisticated lawyers, voir dire of juries, and appeals—
completely mitigate the risk of abuse.  On the other hand, a landowner 
pitted against a large corporation faces an uphill battle; the 
implementation of the good faith business judgment standard 
exacerbates the very difficult burden for a landowner.  Therefore, the 
 
167. Id. at 267. 
168. McKinnon v. Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Wis. 1968) (“Considering all the 
factors—the inadequacy of the consideration, the small benefit that would be accorded [the 
non-landholders], and the oppressive conditions imposed upon the [landholder]—we conclude 
that this contract failed to meet the test of reasonableness that is the sine qua non of the 
enforcement of rights in an action in equity.”).  In McKinnon, the court found an agreement 
between neighbors unenforceable based on a very small benefit to a landowner that bound him 
to an oppressive land use restriction.  Id.  The principals upheld in McKinnon are comparable 
to those at issue here; landowners receiving very little benefit in exchange for an economically 
harmful use or restriction of their land. 
169. See generally 3-6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604 (2001) (prior to 
1975, Louisiana added another factor to the paying quantities doctrine.  The rule here not only 
demanded that production be in paying quantities to the lessee, but that it also furnishes an 
adequate consideration to the lessor). 
170. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (“Consideration of the operator's good faith judgment in 
determining whether a well has produced in paying quantities, however, also protects a lessee 
from lessors who, by exploiting a brief period when a well has not produced a profit, seek to 
invalidate a lease with the hope of making a more profitable leasing arrangement.”). 
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more appropriate interest balancing in a disputed oil and gas lease 
necessitates the application of the reasonably prudent operator standard. 
E. Landowners Must Take Steps to Prevent Oil and Gas Companies 
from Abusing Leases 
While advocating for the reasonably prudent operator standard, this 
Note recognizes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in favor 
of the good faith business judgment standard as part of the test for 
determining when a lease is producing oil and gas in paying quantities.  
Accordingly, this Note attempts to set forth a framework for lawyers and 
landowners to consider their options moving forward under the good 
faith business judgment standard.171  The most important reality is that 
oil and gas companies want to consummate and perform their 
obligations under leases.  Without land rich in oil and gas reserves, 
producing companies cannot fulfill their main function: producing oil 
and gas.  Fittingly, if an oil and gas landsman approaches a landowner 
with a lease, the landowner has significant power in deciding the 
conditions and terms of the lease.172 
The first and most important thing a landowner should do after 
being approached by a landsman173 is consult a lawyer who practices oil 
and gas law.  A lawyer may be able to understand the intricacies of an 
oil and gas lease, including the implications of the habendum clause 
usage of “in paying quantities.”174  Further, as this Note has established, 
oil and gas companies have sophisticated lawyers at their disposal, so 
too should landowners.  A lessor ought to protect his or her self with 
representation as early in the leasing process as possible in order to 
hedge his or her potential future interests.  The most important service a 
lawyer will provide for a landowner is advising, and potentially 
mediating, the negotiations between the landowner and landsman. 
An oil and gas company wants land to develop oil and gas wells 
and to make money.  Landowners, by definition, have land that an oil 
 
171. Unfortunately, landowners already subject to leases with an indeterminate 
habendum clause cannot benefit from advice on their negotiation power. 
172. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Landowners and Oil 
and Gas Leases in Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.elibrary. 
dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-91369/8000-FS-DEP2834.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014) (responding to the hypothetical query of what to do when first being approached with a 
lease by recommending talking to an attorney and negotiating for what a lessor wants). 
173. “Landsman” or “landman” is the name for a person who contracts with landowners 
to form an oil and gas lease.  HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS 
TERMS (14th ed. 2009).  A landsman is often the first person a landowner comes in contact 
with from the oil and gas industry. 
174. Law firms have interpreted  Jedlicka on their websites.  See Holland, supra note 
154. 
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and gas company would want to lease.  Therefore, even though a 
landowner stands to make significant money from a lease, they have a 
lucrative bargaining chip.  A landowner should negotiate for the interests 
most important to him or her before entering into an oil and gas lease.  
Understandably, the indefinite realities of the language, “and as long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities,” should worry 
landowners after Jedlicka.  Consequently, a landowner ought to 
negotiate for a definite term of a lease, or negotiate reparation 
procedures should the production go unfavorably in the eyes of the 
lessor.  While an oil and gas company would prefer an indefinite and 
ongoing lease, the company's desire for more holdings may make 
definite terms a reality.  Ironically, the pro-business imports of Jedlicka 
may shift future leases toward more definite terms as landowners 
become more sophisticated in negotiating with oil and gas companies.  
More definite terms will only become a reality if landowners consult 
attorneys and negotiate for their interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Hydraulic fracturing is a contentious industry practice with many 
legitimate environmental concerns.175  Understandably, landowners may 
disapprove of hydraulic fracturing and want to protect their land from 
potential pollution.  Even still, landowners have entered into binding 
contracts with oil and gas companies for the joint purpose of making 
money from hard-to-reach resources.  To gain the financial benefits of 
natural gas, occasional environmental risks are signed away; however, 
this should not be for an indefinite term.  When the joint purposes of an 
oil and gas lease are ignored an oil and gas lease should be terminable.  
The term in paying quantities should therefore be read with reference to 
the good faith of all the parties and interests of an oil and gas lease.  The 
reasonably prudent operator standard more appropriately balances the 
many interests.  Under the reasonably prudent operator standard, a 
landowner may only terminate a lease if oil and gas is not objectively 
being produced in paying quantities and production is not continuing for 
purely speculative purposes.  Jedlicka ignored landowners’ interests and 
eliminated lessors’ ability to terminate a harmful or purely speculative 
lease. 
Most oil and gas leases contain the indefinite duration of as long 
thereafter as oil and gas are produced in paying quantities.176  Courts in 
other states such as Texas, as seen in Koontz, have implemented a 
 
175. See generally H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24. 
176. The exact order of the wording may differ, but habendum clauses containing an 
indefinite term such as this are common. 
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reasonably prudent operator standard to fill the gap left open in the 
Young test.  Under the Jedlicka decision, there is no need to weigh the 
objective balance between the profits paid by a well and the operating 
expenses needed to raise that profit because the burden of proof under 
Jedlicka is so extreme.177  Jedlicka does not necessitate that the 
subjective test only be used in the case of a marginal well, but rather the 
good faith of the lessee is the only important factor in judging whether a 
well is producing in paying quantities.178  As such, unless a landowner is 
capable of proving bad faith on the part of the lessee, an oil and gas lease 
will continue indefinitely at the whim of a lessee.  While protecting oil 
and gas corporations from arbitrary jury decisions, the good faith 
business judgment standard goes too far in eliminating landowners’ 
opportunities for relief. 
Joseph R. Plukas∗ 
 
 
177. Compare Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899) (“[I]f a well, 
being down, pays a profit,—even a small one, over the operating expenses,—it is producing in 
‘paying quantities' . . . .”), with T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 272 (Pa. 
2012) (“[I]n assessing whether a lease is producing in paying quantities, Young places the 
principal focus on the good faith judgment of the operator.”). 
178. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (“As explained above, pursuant to Young, the operator's 
good faith judgment is the principal focus in determining whether a lease has produced in 
paying quantities.”). 
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